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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
(administered by the
Director of Finance) ,
Plaintiff,

Case No.
10008

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and MARY
MERKLEY SANDER,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case calls for the Supreme Court's review
of the Industrial Commission's proceedings and
decision awarding Workmen's Compensation beneifts to Mary Merkley Sander, relating to the death
of her husband, Isabrand Sander, for the purpose
of determining whether the Commission exceeded
its powers and whether the findings of fact support
the Commission's award.
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DISPOSITION BEFORE
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On July 10, 1963, the Industrial Commission
held a hearing on Mrs. Sander's application. On August 12, 1963 the Industrial Commission rendered
its decision in the form of an Order. The Commission held that Mr. Sander's death on August 4, 1962,
resulted from an accident in the course of his employment. The Commission ordered the employer and
the State Insurance Fund to pay a total of $11,170
compensation to Mary Merkley Sander, plus $525
funeral expenses.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PETITION
The Plaintiff, the State Insurance Fund, in this
certiorari proceeding, seeks to have the Supreme
Court of Utah reverse, vacate and annul the award
which the Industrial Commission made in its decision and order dated August 12, 1963.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the morning of Saturday, August 4, 1962,
Mr. Isabrand Sander was driving an Oldsmobile
automobile in a westerly direction on 4th South
Street in Salt Lake City, and the automobile crashed
into a concrete bridge near 1Oth West Street, causing injuries to Mr. Sander, resulting in almost instant death. Mr. Sander's widow, Mary Merkley
Sander, filed an application with the Industrial ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mission of Utah on April 10, 1963, in which she
alleged that Isabrand Sander's fatal injuries were
received while he was in the course of his employment as the president of I. Sander, Inc. She therefore requested the benefits provided by the Utah
Workmen's Compensation law. The employer corporation's Workmen's Compensation insurance carrier was the State Insurance Fund, which denied
any liability. The Industrial Commission held a hearing on July 10, 1963.
On August 12, 1963 the Industrial Commission rendered its decision in the form of an Order
(R. 97), in which it said that although there was no
evidence, other than custom, to support a finding
that Mr. Sander was in the course of his employment, his death was compensable; and the Commission ordered the State Insurance Fund to pay a total
of $11,710 compensation to Mrs. Sander, plus $525
funeral expenses. On September 3, 1963 the Fund
filed an Application for Rehearing, which the Commission denied on September 23, 1963.
Many years ago Mr. Sander started his oil and
gas distribution business when he was living at
Heber City, Utah. Later he incorporated this business under the name of I. Sander, Inc. In 1950 the
comapny's headquarters were moved to Salt Lake
City; and Mr. and Mrs. Sander also moved their residence to Salt Lake City. At first the company's
office was in one room of the home of Mr. and Mrs.
Hosford at 219 Douglas Street. (Mrs. Hosford was
one of Sander's daughters.) In the meantime Mrs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Sander's sister bought the Ivanhoe Apartments at
415, 417 and 419 East 3rd South in Salt Lake City.
In order to help her fill up some of the apartments,
Mr. and Mrs. Sanders rented and moved into Apt.
8 of the Ivanhoe Apts. Also in 1953 the offices of
I. Sander, Inc. were moved from the Hosford residence to Apartment 14 of the Ivanhoe Apts., which
is at 419 East 3rd South. In 1956 the company's
business activities required more space and different arrangements. So the company purchased some
ground and built a building at 1815 West 5th South
in Salt Lake City for use as its office and trucking
terminal. (R. 15 and 57) All of the company's employees, their desks and other office equipment were
moved from 419 East 3rd South to the company's
offices at 1815 West 5th South, with the exception
of Mr. Sander's desk and some other equipment,
which were left in Apt. No. 14 at 419 East 3rd South,
for his convenience, etc. ( R. 22)
During the three year period the company had
its office in Apt. 14 at 419 East 3rd South, the company issued its checks to pay the rent and all of
the other expenses. There was a little vagueness in
the testimony about the arrangements for payment
of the $70 monthly rental of Apt. 14 after the company's office was moved to west 5th South in 1956.
Mr. Hosford, who was the general manager, testified that the company increased Mr. Sander's salary by an amount sufficient to equal the monthly
rental, and Mr. Sander then paid the rental for Apt.
14 from his own money. But Mr. Hosford said he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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could not remember what amounts Mr. Sander's
salary was increased from and to. (R. 15-16) Mr.
James Heber Moulton was the company's office manager and he made out the payroll checks each month.
He testified that, according to the way he remembered it, Mr. Sander's salary was $2,000 per month
at that time, and Mr. Sander volunteered to pay the
rent on Apt. 14 out of his own salary. This was
agreeable to Mr. Hosford and Mr. Moulton, so Mr.
Sander did that from then on. (R. 58) At a later
period, when the company's financial position was
not very healthy, Mr. Sander's salary was reduced
to $1,000 per month; and he continued to pay the
$70 monthly rental for Apt. 14 from his own salary.
(R. 59)

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT
THE DECEASED, ISABRAND SANDER, WAS
IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT
THE TIME OF THE FATAL COLLISION.
Mr. Isabrand Sander was 72 years old in 1962.
He was still president of the corporation which he
had founded, but it was quite apparent that he was
in substantially a "retired" status. He had transferred practically all of his stock (ownership in the
corporation), to his several children during the years
preceding his death. (R. 28) His son-in-law, Mr.
Hosford, was the general manager of the company
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and was directly in charge of the company's business. Mr. Sander still gave the other officers of the
company his advice and counsel on various occasions; but for most purposes he had retired from
active participation in the affairs of the company.
The so-called "office" in Apt. 14 at 419 East
3rd South, had Mr. Sander's desk in it, and a typewriter and filing cabinets, and there was also a television set, a contour chair, a davenport, a bed, as
well as a stove, refrigerator, kitchen table and
chairs. This "office" apartment was on the same
floor as Apartment No. 8, in which Mr. and Mrs.
Sander lived. He was the only one whose "office"
was supposed to be located in Apt. No. 14. Apparently he could use this apartment in the same way
as some men use their den in their home, as a moreor-less private or semi-private unit to which they
can escape temporarily at periods from the other
members of their family, and in which they can
have some privacy to engage in such serious or frivolous pastimes as they might be inclined. Mr. Sander
could devote as much or as little time to thinking
about the company's welfare and general activities
as he might choose to do, and in discussions with
the company's personnel. He was not required to
punch a time-clock or to spend any particular hours
in Apt. No. 14 or at the 5th South office of the company, or in the performance of any other service
for the company. He also could devote whatever time
he wished to his own personal affairs or matters
having nothing to do with the business of the company. His time was his own to do with as he saw fit.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

The third paragraph of the Industrial Commission's decision ( R. 97) reads as follows:
The only issue to be resolved by the Commission is whether the deceased was in the
course of his employment by I. Sander, Inc.
on August 4, 1962, or more particularly at the
time of the fatal accident, 9 :40 A.M. Was he
in fact on his way to the west side office at
1815 West 5th South Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah?
The Commission was in error in assuming that
the first sentence and the second sentence meant
the san1e thing. The first sentence correctly stated
the main issue to be whether Mr. Sander "was in
the course of his employment * * * at the time of
the fatal accident." The next sentence: "Was he in
fact on his way to the west side office?" is not the
same question. It is not complete. Even if he were
on his way to the company's office at 1815 West
5th South, that fact alone would not be sufficient
to bring him into the course of his employment and
under the coverage of the Utah Workmen's Compensation law. Any employee, whether he is the president of the company or holds some lesser job, must
be doing something more than being "on his way
to" the company's office, in order to be covered. He
is not covered when he is on his way from his home
to his en1ployer's place of business in the morning
(or the commencement of his shift). Neither is he
covered when going to or returning from lunch or
other meal. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. vs. Ind.
Comm., 100 Utah 8, 110 P.2d 334.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The last sentence of the fourth paragraph of
the Commission's decision ( R. 97), quotes the witness, Gregory F. Hosford (who was a son-in-law of
Mr. and Mrs. Sander), as testifying that Mr. Sander
"was enroute from the office at 419 East 3rd South
to the office at 1815 West 5th South." That testimony of Mr. Hosford (R. 18), was nothing but hearsay; and it was his own guess or conclusion. Mr.
Hosford himself admitted that he was not in Salt
Lake City at the time of Mr. Sander's collision.
He was in Fillmore at that time. He first learned
of the accident when Mr. Moulton told him about
it over the telephone. (R. 20) It is interesting to
note that Hosford also jumped to an erroneous conclusion in testifying that Mr. Moulton was on duty
at the west side office that morning. ( R. 20) Actually Mr. Moulton spent most of the morning attending
a family gathering in a building some distance away
from the company's office. (R. 56) On cross examination Mr. Hosford testified that he left Salt Lake
City about 8 :00 A.M. on August 4, 1962 and he
flew to Filmore on some business for the company.
He did not see Mr. Sander at all that day, and he
did not have any conversation with him. (R. 37)
The sixth paragraph of the Industrial Commission's decision (R. 97), reads:
Although we have no evidence, other than
custom, we believe that the evidence adduced
supports a finding that the deceased was on
his way from the east side office to the west
side office at the time of the fatal injury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We assume that the Commission was making
a finding and conclusion to that effect. There might
have been some basis for the Commission to find
that Mr. Sander "was on his way to the west side
office" that morning. Both his custom and Mrs. Sander's testimony that he may have told her, while
they were eating breakfast, that he intended going
to the 5th South office that morning ( R. 52), might
lend some support to such a finding. But the Commission apparently overlooked an important point.
There was absolutely no evidence in the record, either
of custom or otherwise, upon which to base a finding that Mr. Sander "was on his way from the east
side office." (Emphasis added.)
The only testimony from anyone who actually
saw Mr. Sander or had any conversation with him
on the morning of August 4, 1962, came from his
wife, the applicant in the Industrial Commission's
proceedings. Mr. and Mrs. Sander slept in separate
bedrooms in their apartment. She testified that when
she arose that morning she first went to his room.
He was already up. (R. 48) She saw him in the
bathroon1, and said, "Well, good morning." When
he finished in the bathroom he went over to Apt.
14. She prepared their breakfast, then called him
on the telephone about 7:30. He came over to their
apartment (No. 8) and they ate breakfast together.
She first testified that she did not remember of
him telling her, while they were eating breakfast,
that he was going to the 5th South office that morning. ( R. 50) Later she said that he may or may not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
have told her that he was going to the 5th South
office that morning. (R. 52) She testified that customarily he did go down to the 5th South office on
Saturday mornings.
Mrs. Sander did not know at what time Mr.
Sander had gone out and driven away in the Oldsmobile. The first that she knew he was gone was
when she looked out of their kitchen window and
she noticed that the Oldsmobile was not there. She
estimated that that was about 9 :30 A.M. ( R. 51)
There was no proof as to what Mr. Sander was
doing in Apt. 14 for that part of the time he may
have been there between 7 A.M. and 7 :30 A.M.
that day; whether he was working, or reading the
morning newspaper or listening to news on the
radio or TV, or taking a nap, or any of the various
things which different men in Salt Lake City do
between 7 :00 and 7 :30 in the morning on Saturdays. Mrs. Sander did not know what he was doing
in Apt. 14 that morning. He did not tell her that
he was working. ( R. 49) There is no evidence of
any kind that he did any work for the corporation
that morning. The mere fact that he might have
done some work in Apt. 14 would not necessarily
mean that he had entered on duty for the company
shortly after 7 A.M. and that all of his actions and
movements after 7 A.M. that day must be considered as coming within the scope of his employment.
There is also a lack of any competent evidence
to prove what Mr. Sander might have been doing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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after he finished eating his breakfast and before
the Oldsmobile he was driving crashed into the concrete bridge later that morning. With such lack of
proof, any finding or inference which the Industrial
Commission might make, to the effect that after
his breakfast Mr. Sander went back to Apt. 14 and
then later went from there to the 5th South office,
is clearly unsupported by competent evidence.
It is our contention that there was no proof that
it was Mr. Sander's custom to go from what the
Commission called the "east side office" (Apt. 14 in
the Ivanhoe Apartments), to the company's main
office on 5th South on Saturday mornings generally,
or on that Saturday morning, August 4, 1962 in
particular.
Mr. Hosford testified that Mr. Sander "periodically would come down to 1815 West 5th South to
see us." (R. 17) He also explained that his understanding relating to Mr. Sander's movements on the
day of his death, were based on his knowledge of his
custom for the previous 13 years (R. 37); also what
he (Hosford) was told over the telephone while he
was in Fillmore, and what he was told when he returned to Salt Lake City. (R. 19 and 37) But even
Mr. Hosford (who was apparently doing all he could
to make the case compensable), did not state that
it was Mr. Sander's custom to go from Apt. 14 at
419 E. 3rd South, on the occasions when he would
come down to the 5th South office. It would have
been only hearsay if he had so testified.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Moulton testified that Mr. Sander came
down to the 5th South office often. (R.54) When
asked what he meant by "often," he said that in
one period Mr. Sander had spent the whole day there
for two weeks at a time. Then there were "other
times when we'd go for a whole week without seeing
him." On August 4, 1962 Mr. Moulton did not know
whether Mr. Sander was coming down to the 5th
South office. (R. 55-56) He had not talked with him
on the phone. Both he and Mr. Nelson, the accountant, testified that they did not have any arrangements to meet Mr. Sander at the 5th South office
that morning; and there was no special meeting
planned for that morning. ( R. 68)
Mr. Nelson, and his son who took care of the
lawn, were the only employees of the company at
the 5th South office after Moulton left for his family
gathering. (R. 65 and 67)
There was considerable effort on the part of
applicant's attorney and witnesses to establish that
Mr. Sander had been working on a device, somewhat
like a miniature slot machine, which might be used
as a sales promotion scheme by service stations to
influence customers to buy gasoline at their particular stations in hopes of getting their purchase free,
if three numbers of the same kind came up on the
device. (R. 19, 54 and 69) Mr. Sander had one of
those devices in the trunk of his Oldsmobile at the
time of the fatal crash. At least it was there the
following Monday or Tuesday when Mr. Hosford and
Mr. Moulton and Mr. Nelson examined the trunk
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the wrecked car. (R. 19, 55 and 69) Mr. Sander
had been working on that device for quite a while
prior to that day, and he no doubt had been carrying
it in his automobile for some considerable time.
There was no evidence that he was making any special trip to the company's 5th South office that morning in connection with that device, or for any other
purpose; and the Industrial Commission's decision
so held. (R. 97) Therefore it cannot have any significance in the consideration of the question of
whether he was in the course of his employment that
morning. In the case of Greer vs. Ind. Comm., 74
Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900, the Utah Supreme Court
held that carrying of a tool or other object relating
to the employer's business, must have been the main
purpose of the trip in order to be under the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation law, and not
just incidental to the trip of the employee in going
to or from work.
There was also some testimony that the corporation paid the monthly charge for the telephone
which Mr. Sander had in Apt. 14 of the Ivanhoe
Apartments, in his own name under an unlisted
number. (R. 14 and 58) That fact was not of particular importance. The company also paid the telephone bill on Mr. Hosford's home telephone; and
probably also on Mr. Moulton's. (R. 30-31) That
was done because all of those phones were used relating to the company's business on occasions.
In the discussion of our present case, the case
of Vitagraph, Inc., vs. Ind. Comm., 96 Utah 190, 85
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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P.2d 601, contains some points which are helpful.
Mr. P. 0. Perry was employed on a part time basis
by Vitagraph, Inc. to be present at times when their
pictures were being shown in different theatres in
Salt Lake City. He would check the number of paying customers and at a later time make a written
report and mail it to the company's office. After one
such evening at the Southeast Theatre he put the
tallying machine in his pocket and started to go to
his home. While crossing a street for the purpose
of boarding a bus he was struck by an automobile
and injured. He had intended preparing his report
at home that evening or the following morning, as
he usually did. On some occasions he had prepared
the report before leaving the theatre. The Industrial
Commission awarded compensation to Mr. Perry.
The Supreme Court annulled the award. The Court
held that the accident was not in the course of his
employment. At page 194 of the Court's opinion,
it said:
The question as to when one is in the
course of his employment has often been before the courts. Certain indicia to guide one
in answering the question have been laid down
by the courts but no fixed rule can be promulgated and each case must be determined largely from its own facts. It seems definitely settled that if a workman is injured in the normal course of things, in going to or from his
work or place of employment, that is the result of the general hazards which all must
meet and assume and is not in the course of
his employment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At page 2 01 of the Court's opinion is a quote
fron1 a previous case of Greer vs. Ind. Comm., 74
Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900:
But the mission (for the employer) must
be the major factor in the journey or movement, and not merely incidental thereto; that
is to say if incidental to the main purpose of
going to or from the place of employment, it
would not bring such person under the protection of the Act. * * * Under the facts in the
instant case, it is clear that the deceased was
not upon any special mission for his employer
at the time of the accident. There was nothing
he was doing for his master at the time which
exposed him to the perils of the street. He was
merely going from his home to his place of
employment. The fact that he was carrying
the saw was merely incidental. * * * In this
case the deceased was not injured while he
was sharpening the saw at his home. The accident did not occur while he was actually engaged in the performance of a duty for the
employer. The dangers of the street between
his home and the stockyards were not incident
to his employment, but were dangers common
to all.
To the same effect as the above mentioned
Greer case, is one cited in 99 Corpus Juris Secundum, Section 232 relating to the "going and coming rule," namely Sylvan vs. Sylvan Bros., 82 SE2d
794, 225 s. c. 429 :
Injuries sustained by executive who
slipped and fell on sjdewalk on the way from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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home to place of employment was neither in
course of, nor arising out of, his employment,
notwithstanding he was carrying business
papers which he had prepared in his home previous evening; the journey to and from home
to place of employment was not in course of
employment, because main purpose of it was
to go home or to return to place of employment, and journey would be made irrespective
of homework which employee might be carrying.
We are familiar with the case of Morgan vs.
lnd Comm., 92 Utah 129, 66 P.2d 144, which the
defendants may cite in their argument. Samuel Morgan was the principal of the Davis County High
School at Kaysvile. On the afternoon of Sunday,
Feb. 2, 1936, he went from his home to the school
building for the purpose of making up his monthly
report to the school district office, which he had
been unable to complete the previous Friday and
Saturday; also he was going to return some account
books, etc. to his office safe. After entering the building he found that he had left his personal keys at
home, including the key to the principal's office. He
returned home to obtain the key. He was detained
at home by his lunch and some visitors and some
other things of a personal nature; so he did not start
back to the school building until10 o'clock that evening. When he was walking on the roadway between
his home and the school building he was struck by
an automobile and injured. After hearing his case,
the Industrial Commission denied his claim for compensation benefits. The Supreme Court of Utah reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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versed the Commission's decision. The Court held
that Mr. Morgan was on a special trip for his employer at the time of his accident and was therefore
covered by the W. C. law.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in the
Morgan case was by a unanimous opinion, Justice
Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion. But four years
later, in the case of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. vs.
Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 8, 110 P.2d 334, Justice Wolfe
also wrote a concurring opinion, in which he said
(at page 11) :
If the case of Morgan vs. Industrial
Comm. of Utah is correctly decided it is in

point for the application herein and should be
conclusive. But I do not think it was correctly decided. * * *where an employee is returning to do overtime work of the same nature
as his regular work and where he stays over
the regular time to perform it, he cannot be
said to be on a special errand for his employer.
Morgan was, within limits, his own boss. He
had certain duties to perform at the school.
Whether he performed them during regular
hours or during such times as he might himself choose, would not put him on the course
of a special errand so as to make his coming
to and going from the locale of his work a
part of the special errand. I am forced, therefore, to con~lude that the Morgan case was
w~o~gly decided and that my own concurring
opinion failed to note the distinction between
ordinary work performed out of hours there being more of it done- and the special
errand where the employment sets the travelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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er forth upon a journey for some special purpose and exposes him to its perils.''
In the above mentioned case of Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. vs. lnd Comm., the employee, Lee
James Harris, was working overtime on the evening of May 8, 1939. Before the work was finished
he borrowed the company motorcycle, drove home
to dinner, took his little sister for a ride, ate his dinner; and on the return trip to his employer's premises
he had an accident. The Industrial Commission
awarded Workmen's Compensation benefits to Harris; but the Supreme Court of Utah annulled the
award. The Court's opinion said that it was immaterial whether Harris was specifically directed to go
to dinner or not. At page 10 it said:
The specific direction merely fixed the
time of going, but did not control Harris' actions while going to, eating, or returning from
dinner. Stress has been laid on the fact that
Harris was working overtime and the accident did not happen during regular working
hours. That, too, we believe to be immaterial,
as no effort was made to control his actions
while absent for dinner.
POINT 2
BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN AWARD, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS REQUIRED BY
LAW TO DENY COMPENSATION BENEFITS
TO DECEASED'S DEPENDENT.
In the case of Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100
Utah 68, 110 P.2d 374, Dr. Barton H. Wherritt died
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from injuries which he received when his automobile plunged over an embankment in City Creek
Canyon about midnight, Feb. 4, 1940. That day Dr.
When·itt had worked at the Intermountain Clinic
until about 6 P.M., when he went home to dinner.
About 8:-15 P.M. he left home, telling his wife that
he had some work to do at the Clinic and some calls
to make at the hospital. She also testified that he
had earlier told her that he had to take some samples
to the State Board of Health laboratory (in the
State Capitol Building) to be analyzed. He was seen
at the Clinic at 9 :50 P.M. and at the L.D.S. Hospital about 10:40 P.M. His fatal accident was about
midnight on Wasatch Boulevard north of the State
Capitol. There was nothing in the record to show
that he left any samples at the Board of Health laboratory that night, or that he had them in his car, or
that he took any samples from the Clinic. In sustaining the Industrial Commission's denial of compensation in that case, the Supreme Court of Utah,
at page 70, said:
T_he question left unanswered by the evidence Is what Dr. Barton H. Wherritt was doing at the time of the accident. Was he about
his employer's business or was he on an errand of his own?
·
~he burden _of proof is upon applicant to
establish her claim for compensation. Higley
l'S: Ind. Comm., 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac. 306;
Btngham Mines Co. vs. Alsop. 59 Utah 306
203 Pac. 644.
'
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Where the industrial Commission is driven to
surmise or conjecture, the injured person or his dependents cannot recover compensation benefits. The
fact finder is not bound to adopt the theory of the
applicant even if there is some evidence to support
it. Sugar vs. Ind. Comm., 94 Utah 56, 75 P.2d 311.
Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not sufficient to justify a finding in behalf of the applicant. Higley vs. Ind. Comm., 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac.
306.
It certainly cannot be presumed that an officer
of a company, whether he is partialy retired or otherwise, is in the course of his employment for the whole
24 hours of every day, just because he might, during that period of the day when he is at home, or
while driving between his home and the place of
business, or while he is eating his meals, or is shaving himself, or while he is in bed unable to sleep,
or on any other such occasion he might be thinking
about some of the company's business affairs, or
"trying to solve a problem," or "mulling things over
in his mind," etc.
Hearsay evidence, although allowable in an Industrial Commission hearing, is not sufficient upon
which to base an award. John Scowcrojt & Sons Co.
vs. Ind. Comm., 70 Utah 116, 258 Pac. 339; Vecchio
vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 128, 22 P.2d 212; Fish Lake
Resort Co. vs. Ind Comm., 73 Utah 479, 275 Pac. 580.
In the case of Diaz vs. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 77,
13 P.2d 307, at page 86 of the Court's opinion is
the following:
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• • • it • • • is urged by the defendants
that • • • the commission was not bound by
the usual common law or statutory rules of
evidence. • • * In support of that the cases of
Garfield Smelting Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 53
Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57, and Rockefeller vs. Ind.
Comm., 58 Utah 124, 197 Pac. 1038, are cited.
• • • In the Garfield case a statement is made
that the commission in its investigations may
have recourse to hearsay evidence, but at the
same time the court in most emphatic language also said : "Yet when it makes its findings every finding of fact must be based on
some competent evidence."
and at page 87 of the Court's opinion:
If a material finding is not supported by
sufficient or is against the legal competent
evidence, it will be disapproved and set aside.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the decision and order of the Industrial Commission dated August 12,
1963, should be annulled by this Court.
Respectfuly submitted,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney for Plaintiff,
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